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Abstract: 
The process of contact tracing to reduce the spread of 
highly infectious and life-threatening diseases has 
traditionally been a primarily manual process 
managed by public health entities.  This process 
becomes challenged when faced with a pandemic of 
the proportions of SARS-CoV2.  Digital contact 
tracing has been proposed as way to augment manual 
contact tracing and lends itself to widely proliferated 
devices such as cell phones and wearables.  This 
paper describes a method and analysis of determining 
whether two cell phones, carried by humans, were in 
persistent contact of no more than 6 feet over 15 
minutes using Bluetooth Low Energy signals.  The 
paper describes the approach to detecting these 
signals, as well as a data-driven performance analysis 
showing that larger numbers of samples coupled with 
privacy preserving auxiliary information improves 
detection performance. 
Introduction 
COVID-19, the disease which occurs when infected 
with the SARS-CoV2 virus, is primarily propagated 
through the population via close contact between an 
infected person (“index case”) and another person. 
The virus may be spread prior to the appearance of 
symptoms in the infected individual [1,2]. To stem 
the spread of the disease, minimizing contact between 
potentially infected persons and other non-infected 
persons is required. Currently public 
health entities engage in a triad of contact tracing, 
testing, and quarantine to minimize the spread.  The 
current approach to contact tracing is a primarily 
manual approach which relies on interviews with 
infected individuals [3,4]. 
Identifying these close contacts (which, per current 
CDC guidelines, are those who have spent over 15 
minutes within 6 feet of an index case [4-6]) may be 
facilitated by using automated tracing apps deployed 
on cell phones. These apps continuously emit 
Bluetooth low energy (BLE) “chirps” which other 
phones will periodically scan, and record the pseudo-
random bit sequence emitted by the chirping phone as 
well as the estimated power with which the chirp was 
received [7-9]. 
 The PACT 3 [10] program has proposed a method for 
making a binary decision based on received BLE 
signal power estimates: are the two phones “Too 
Close For Too Long?” (TCFTL). Previous work has 
looked at the performance of some limited detector 
strategies using BLE as a discriminator for relative 
range between phones [11]. Our work looks at 
optimizing detector strategies as a function of 
available auxiliary data which may be available to the 
phone.  
A key factor in declaring that a contact is TCFTL is 
determining that the range between the phones is less 
than 6 feet. Unfortunately, accurately determining 
range between RF devices simply by measuring 
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received power requires knowing many system 
parameters a-priori, including transmit power into the 
antenna, both transmit and receive antenna patterns 
and relative orientations, multipath environment, and 
shadowing between the devices. In a TCFTL test 
scenario, none of these are likely to be known, other 
than the raw power into the transmit antenna. This 
makes estimating the “too close” portion of TCFTL 
quite difficult. 
We propose to solve the problem by leveraging two 
factors: knowledge of the relative carriage of the 
transmitting and receiving devices (such as if the 
device is being hand-carried or residing in a pocket), 
and the fact that over the “too long” period, we will 
have multiple measurements of received signal 
power. This paper describes how we leverage this 
information, including data collection campaigns to 
understand some of the typical propagation variations 
seen in a TCFTL scenario. We then evaluate the 
performance of various detectors, and make 
predictions on overall performance of the TCFTL 
detector in a contact tracing framework. 
BLE Signal Power Phenomenology 
BLE signaling in the context of COVID-19 contact 
tracing is done through “advertisements”, which are 
short messages (typically less than 500 bits) at 
relatively high data rates (~1 Mb/s) that are repeatedly 
broadcast from a device at roughly 250 ms intervals. 
These advertisements can contain limited data, 
including the pseudo-random bit sequence generated 
by the transmitting device, as well as some indication 
of the status of the transmitting phone. The 
transmissions occur on a subset of three of the BLE 
frequency channels (2402 MHz, 2426 MHz, and 2480 
MHz), roughly occurring at the low, mid, and high 
frequency ranges of the BLE allotted frequencies [12-
14]. In the COVID-19 contact tracing 
implementation, the transmitted signal power into the 
antenna is encoded into the advertisement, allowing 
the receiver to estimate what power level was 
transmitted by the advertising phone, which in turn 
allows the receiving phone to produce an estimate of 
the path loss (attenuation) of the signal from the 
transmitting device to the receiving device. 
The receiver, as implemented on Android and iOS 
devices, will make an estimate of the received signal 
power, referred to as an RSSI (Received Signal 
Strength Indication) measurement, which is 
nominally the received power in milliwatts (dBm). 
This estimate is quantized in 1 dB increments. Most 
devices have sensitivities which allow demodulation 
of packets with RSSI values of -100 dBm or greater. 
It is well known that in the 2.4 GHz ISM band where 
BLE signals exist, signal attenuation due to human 
shadowing (a human in close proximity to either the 
transmitting or receiving device, blocking direct line 
of sight propagation) can be quite large. In addition, 
the antenna patterns of BLE devices such as smart 
phones can be highly anisotropic, with large 
variations in gain as a function of angle and 
polarization. Finally, propagation in the 2.4 GHz ISM 
band in indoor environments is subject to potentially 
deep multipath (Rayleigh) fading from nearby 
reflections. All of these factors make the job of 
determining range through only power measurements 
quite difficult [15].  
To understand the severity of these variable 
conditions, we undertook a measurement campaign 
using actual iOS devices equipped with specially 
designed “apps” which allowed for rapid collection of 
RSSI data between pairs of phones which were a 
known distance apart [16]. Because we needed to 
understand the variations in attenuation as a function 
of personal carriage of the phones, as well as the 
relative position of the phone carriers with respect to 
the line of sight between the two phones, we took 
repeated measurements with phones in different 
carriage positions (front pants pocket, back pants 
pocket, shirt pocket, in hand, in bag), standing vs. 
sitting [17], and with different rotations of the two 
individuals with respect to the line of sight direction 
(measurements were made every 45 degrees of 
rotation). For each rotational pose angle, separation 
distance, and phone carriage state, multiple RSSI 
measurements were made. This was important due to 
the fact that each RSSI measurement is made on a 
single BLE frequency – and the Rayleigh scattering 
will typically be frequency dependent. 
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The result of these measurements is a data set that can 
be used to characterize the attenuation between iOS 
devices as a function of many different environmental 
parameters. The data set is available on GitHub [18]. 
Detector Methodology 
The objective of a TCFTL detector is to develop a 
binary function mapping RSSI estimates into a “yes” 
or “no” decision regarding the “too close” portion of 
the detector. Upon analyzing the recorded data, it is 
obvious that conditioning this decision on the state of 
the propagation channel (other than the range, which 
we assume cannot be known a-priori) is 
advantageous. We believe that some of the channel 
state information, such as the phone carriage status, 
may be able to be estimated by the phones themselves 
using auxiliary sensors such as the light sensor, 
proximity sensor, and accelerometers, all of which 
would have little implications on privacy. We believe 
that it will be more difficult to estimate things like the 
relative pose angles of the persons carrying the 
phones (i.e., shadowing), the relative angles of the 
antennas to each other, and the local multipath 
environment. As such, we will treat the realizations of 
these states as random processes, which cause the 
RSSI measurements to appear stochastic. Thus, we 
characterize the channel attenuation in terms of a 
probability density function (PDF), indexed by range 
of the link and phone carriage status, defined as 
𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝑠𝑠, 𝑐𝑐), where 𝑋𝑋 is the observed (potentially multi-
sampled) data, 𝑠𝑠 is the separation between phones and 
𝑐𝑐 is the carriage state of the phones. 
Example PDF estimates from measured data are 
shown in Figure 1, indexed by inter-phone range at a 
fixed phone carriage state, but varying multipath and 
pose angles. The measured data clearly indicates a 
trend towards higher attenuation values at longer 
ranges, but it is also clear that there are large overlaps 
of PDFs for different ranges. Note that for the 
remainder of this paper, we are using data from 
iPhones and adjusting the RSSI values to be 
consistent with a +12dBm input power to the 
transmitting antenna. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Estimated RSSI PDFs: Blue: 15 foot 
separation, both phones in pants pockets, Green: 15 
foot separation, both phones in shirt pockets, Cyan: 6 
foot separation, both phones in pants pockets, Red: 6 
foot separation, both phones in shirt pockets. 
For a binary test, such as that in the TCFTL detector, 
optimality is achieved using a likelihood ratio test 
[19]. Here, optimality can be defined using either the 
Neyman-Pearson or Bayes criteria, where Bayes 
criteria requires assigning costs for misclassification 
of TCFTL. Let us define the state of being “too close 
for too long” as hypothesis 𝐻𝐻1, and the state of not 
being too close for too long as 𝐻𝐻0. Then the likelihood 
ratio is defined as: 
𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋, 𝑐𝑐) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻1, 𝑐𝑐)
𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐), 
or equivalently, a log-likelihood ratio: 
𝑙𝑙(𝑋𝑋, 𝑐𝑐) = ln�𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻1, 𝑐𝑐)� − ln�𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐)�. 
In the case of multiple independent observations 
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁, then the ensemble log-likelihoods ln (𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻1, 𝑐𝑐)) and ln (𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐)) become products 
of single-sample likelihood terms, and 𝑙𝑙(𝑋𝑋, 𝑐𝑐) can be 
expressed as: 
𝑙𝑙(𝑋𝑋, 𝑐𝑐) = �[ln�𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖/𝐻𝐻1, 𝑐𝑐)� − ln�𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐)�]
𝑖𝑖
 
Or equivalently, 
𝑙𝑙(𝑋𝑋, 𝑐𝑐) = �𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
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where 𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐(∗) is a potentially non-linear transformation 
of the input data (conditioned on the carriage state). 
In the Neyman-Pearson optimal test, this likelihood 
ratio is compared to a threshold; if it exceeds the 
threshold, event 𝐻𝐻1 is declared; if it does not exceed 
the threshold, then 𝐻𝐻0 is declared. A block diagram 
can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Block diagram for optimal likelihood ratio 
binary hypothesis test 
 When the PDF of both 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻1, 𝑐𝑐) and 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐) 
are Gaussian, the transformation is linear, and the log-
likelihood ratio is simply the sum of the data points. 
If the distribution of the data is log-Normal, then the 
optimal non-linearity is a logarithmic function; i.e., 
summing the power of the samples in a dB scale. For 
the TCFTL detector, we are presented with data that 
has already been transformed by a logarithmic non-
linearity, and is in a dB scale. 
Our method for defining the optimization is to 
consider the true metric for which we would like to 
optimize for the contact tracing problem. We would 
like an automatic contact tracing system for which the 
likelihood of detecting ALL the contacts that are “too 
close” is possible. This puts a bound on the lowest 
power we can set the BLE advertisement to ensure it 
is receivable between phones. At this power level, 
there will be a maximum range for which our receiver 
has sufficient sensitivity to correctly decode the BLE 
message. Ideally, we would like a detector that 
correctly identifies cases where people are “too close” 
at a high probability, while minimizing the number of 
“too close” declarations of phone pairs that exceed 6 
feet (phones that are not “too close”). We form a 
weighted average of the separation-conditioned PDF 
functions, where the weighting function of separation 
distance is defined by the physical density of potential 
contacts as a function of separation distance. Define 
this physical density as a function of separation from 
the index case 𝑠𝑠 as 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠). As an example, if we assume 
that potential contacts are uniformly distributed in 2-
D space around the index case, then 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) will be 
linear in 𝑠𝑠. Then, the 𝐻𝐻1 distribution will be: 
𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻1, 𝑐𝑐) = � 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) ∗ 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝑠𝑠, 𝑐𝑐)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠.Max TCFTL true
0
 
Equivalently,  
𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐) = � 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) ∗ 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝑠𝑠, 𝑐𝑐)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠Max BLE range
Max TCFTL true . 
Using these distributions, we can then generate an 
optimal likelihood ratio test. Note that for 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻1, 𝑐𝑐) 
and 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐) to be valid probability density functions, 
appropriate scaling of 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) must be used, and will in 
general be different for the 𝐻𝐻0 and 𝐻𝐻1 cases. 
Given the measured conditional distribution functions 
of the RSSI data (measured in dB) we have evaluated 
optimal nonlinearities for different phone carriage 
conditions as well as different optimization criteria. 
Figure 3 shows a calculated optimal non-linearity for 
the case of both phones being in front pants pockets, 
with 𝐻𝐻0 corresponding to the weighted PDF for 
longer separation between phones and 𝐻𝐻1 
corresponding to 6 foot separation: 
 
Figure 3: Estimated optimal nonlinearity for TCFTL 
detector in case of both phones in pants pockets 
In general, the calculation of this non-linearity is 
difficult to do accurately because towards the high 
RSSI levels, the estimated likelihood value for the H0 
distribution goes to 0, while the value of H1 may still 
be relatively large. This generates an ill-conditioned 
ratio. We compensate for this by applying an arbitrary 
“floor” for the value of  𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋/𝐻𝐻0, 𝑐𝑐), which sets the 
maximum value of the calculated non-linearity. Two 
things become immediately evident: the function is 
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highly non-linear, and data weighting (the magnitude 
of the weighting coefficients) is very low for low 
RSSI values, indicating that the optimal detector 
statistic will be heavily dominated by high-RSSI 
values. Intuitively, this makes sense, as at these RSSI 
levels, it is highly unlikely that any H0 event would 
have occurred. This motivates considering an 
alternate detector, referred to as the M-of-N detector. 
In this detector, operating on N samples, a step-
function non-linearity is defined (0 below a given 
threshold, 1 above the threshold), and the likelihood 
ratio statistic is now simply the count of detections 
that exceed the threshold. If this count exceeds M, 
then a detection is declared. These M-of-N detectors 
are often used in radar signal processing because of 
their simplicity of operation, and because in many 
cases, the loss in performance versus an optimal 
detector, even in Gaussian noise, is quite small. In 
addition, the detection error tradeoff (DET) curve, a 
measure of performance of these detectors, can be 
easily calculated given a measured (non-analytic) 
PDF. These detectors can be optimized over two 
coefficients for a given number of samples N; the 
threshold point τ for the initial nonlinearity, and the 
value of M chosen. A block diagram for the M of N 
detector is shown in Figure 4. By the block diagram, 
it can be seen that the M of N detector can be an 
optimal likelihood ratio detector for some specific 
distributions for H1 and H0. Given the measured 
optimal non-linearity for the TCFTL detector, it is 
believed that this detector should be close to optimal 
(in a Neyman-Pearson sense) in performance, while 
being more simple to optimize for a given detection 
performance point. 
 
Figure 4: Block diagram for M of N detector 
For the remainder of this paper, we will consider the 
performance of these M-of-N detectors, including a 
further sub-optimal subset of these detectors where M 
is forced to be 1 (a maximum value detector). 
 
 
Data Analysis 
Data was collected and PDFs were generated over a 
wide range of phone separations and carriage states. 
From this data, we were able to optimize M-of-N 
detectors for different optimization criteria and phone 
carriage states. Note again that for any number of 
samples N the two detector parameters which require 
optimization are only the initial RSSI threshold and 
the count M. For each carriage state, we evaluated 
detector performance as a function of the number of 
looks N available to the detector. DET (detection 
error tradeoff) curves (a way of visualizing the 
probability of detection versus the probability of false 
alarm) were calculated by varying the nonlinearity 
threshold and then minimizing false alarms by 
optimizing the M value. In the case of the maximum 
value detector, only the nonlinearity threshold was 
varied. As an example, the DET curves for choosing 
N equal to 6, 12, 24, and 48 samples when both 
phones are in pockets are plotted in Figure 5. For 
reference, we have included the “coin flip” decision 
curve, which would be achieved if there was no 
information in the RSSI measurements. 
 
Figure 5: DET curves for M-of-N TCFTL detector for 
both phones in pants pockets for various values of N 
We also calculated the DET curves for the same 
scenario, but this time using only a maximum value 
detector. This is shown in figure 6. 
   
PACT Technical Report #1   6 
 
 
Figure 6: DET curves for 1-of-N TCFTL detector for 
both phones in pants pockets for various values of N 
Some key items can be seen in these two plots. As the 
value of N increases, the performance of the M-of-N 
detectors increase at a much higher rate than the 
performance of the maximum value detector. A 
second point to note is that for low values of N, the 
maximum value detector and the M-of-N detector 
perform almost identically at high values of PD. This 
can be explained by noting that for small N, it is likely 
that the optimal value of M is 1. 
To illustrate how performance varies with phone 
carriage, we also show in Figures 7 and 8 the DET 
curves for the case where propagation is better, when 
phones are carried in shirt pockets. 
 
Figure 7: DET curves for M-of-N TCFTL detector for 
both phones in shirt pockets for various values of N 
 
Figure 8: DET curves for 1-of-N TCFTL detector for 
both phones in shirt pockets for various values of N 
Note that the overall detector performance in this case 
is much better, because the shadowing loss tends to 
decrease as the phone is extended from the body. In 
the case of shirt pockets, the phones tend to be further 
from the body than when they are in pants pockets. 
The trend where M-of-N detectors outperform 
maximum value detectors for higher values of N 
continues. 
It is also instructive to look at the optimal nonlinearity 
for this phone carriage state. Figure 9 shows that 
while the structure of the nonlinearity remains similar 
to that for pants-pocket carriage, the point at which 
the weight dramatically increases shifts to higher 
RSSI values. This implies that the threshold which 
provides a given PD for M-of-N detectors or 
maximum value detectors will change dramatically 
based on phone carriage. 
 
Figure 9: Estimated optimal nonlinearity for TCFTL 
detector in case of both phones in shirt pockets 
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It is quite possible that the phone carriage state will 
change during the “too long” period of observation 
used for the TCFTL detector. Up to this point, we 
have assumed that we can use an optimal M-of-N 
detector for each specific phone carriage state – but 
the true detector must operate when some samples are 
drawn from one phone carriage state and other 
samples are drawn from different phone carriage 
states. Our proposed method of implementation for 
this detector is as follows: 
• On a sample-by-sample basis, correct the 
measured RSSI value based on the known 
phone carriage state of that measurement. 
This corresponds to a fixed 
addition/subtraction to the RSSI value unique 
to the particular phone carriage state, such 
that each state would now have aligned 
nonlinearity thresholds for their optimal 
detectors 
• The M-value and thresholds will be 
calculated using a minimax strategy. Given 
that the realization of phone carriage cannot 
be controlled, we pick the nonlinearity 
threshold and M value to give the best 
performance possible under the worst-case 
phone carriage state. This worst-case state 
can be calculated by our previous single-
phone-carriage state detector optimizations. 
The resulting detector will therefore have the 
best worst-case performance over any 
realized set of phone carriage conditions. 
If phone carriage information is not available to the 
detector, it is clear from these plots that using a 
common M-of-N or maximum value detector across 
all phone carriage states will provide much poorer 
performance. To understand the implications of 
different detector performance points, we introduce 
the concept of False Discovery Rate (FDR). FDR 
attempts to capture the ratio of false contact 
declarations (declaring a contact as being too close for 
too long, when in fact it was not too close) to the total 
number of contact declarations. If this ratio equals 1, 
then all declared contacts would be false. If the ratio 
is 0, then all of the declarations correspond to true 
detections. This metric is important in automated 
contact tracing, because for the contact tracing system 
to be effective, a declaration of TCFTL should initiate 
a series of events, potentially including self-
quarantine and the contact of local public health 
authorities, who may schedule testing. A high FDR 
will unnecessarily initiate this sequence of events in a 
potentially large group of people. In addition, if the 
FDR of a system is known to be high, public 
confidence in the efficacy of the app may be eroded, 
negating any benefit to overall public health due to 
people ignoring TCFTL declarations made by the 
app. 
In order to evaluate FDR, we first have to hypothesize 
prior distributions on both the physical distribution of 
potential contacts around an index case (similar to the 
way we did when generating H0 and H1) and the 
phone carriage states of the contacts and index case. 
For a given phone carriage state, we can calculate the 
expected number of true contacts (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) in the 
following manner: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =  � 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠Max TCFTL true
0
, 
where 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) is defined as before (but in this case, 
remains unscaled), and 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) is the probability of 
declaring detection of a contact for a given detector at 
range 𝑠𝑠. Similarly, the expected number of false 
contacts 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 for a given phone carriage will then be 
given by: 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 =  � 𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠Max BLE range
Max TCFTL true . 
 
Note that the integrand is the same for both 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 and 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. In 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇, the expression 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠) would be referred to 
as the probability of false alarm (since the argument 
𝑠𝑠 is confined to ranges at which there are no true 
contacts to detect), but it is in fact the same function 
as that used in calculating 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. We can take a weighted 
sum of these expected values (where the weights 
correspond to the assumed probabilities of a given 
phone carriage state) to generate the overall expected 
number of true contact declarations and false contact 
declarations for a given assumed density of contacts. 
For the remainder of the paper, we will assume that 
the potential contacts are distributed uniformly in 2-
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D space. We will vary our assumptions on phone 
carriage state to evaluate how that effects outcomes. 
Note that for ease of calculation, we will continue to 
assume that for a given TCFTL test, the phone 
carriage states will remain constant for the duration of 
the contact. 
One issue faced in our calculation of an overall FDR 
is that, due to measurement limitations, we only have 
data sets collected to inter-phone ranges of 15 feet. 
However, we realize that propagation, even at lower 
power levels, will allow reception of BLE signals at 
up to 30 feet. To solve the problem of lack of data, we 
have made some approximations. Our first 
approximation is that at ranges of 15 feet or longer, it 
is likely that the local multipath environments around 
the two phones are somewhat decoupled – thus the 
effects of multipath on the distribution of RSSI values 
will effectively be the same for all phone separations 
in excess of 15 feet. We also assume that the 
shadowing effects due to pose angle of the phone 
carriers will effectively become independent of range. 
Under these assumptions, we can then take the 
measured RSSI data at 15 foot phone separation and 
simply “shift” the values by an amount appropriate 
for the excess path loss commensurate with a longer 
inter-phone separation, and generate PDFs based on 
this synthesized data, which then can be used in 
assessing detection probabilities at these extended 
ranges. 
Based on this methodology, we look at the 
performance of the baseline Apple|Google (A|G) API, 
where we consider two prior distributions for phone 
carriage: 
• Equally likely that any of the phone carriage 
conditions for which we have current 
measurements occur 
• Phone carriage biased such that there is a 
30% chance of carrying in hand, and 40% 
probability of being in the standing position 
If results for these two different priors are similar, we 
feel that the results will be somewhat independent of 
actual phone carriage statistics. 
The following table illustrates the phone carriage 
cases for which data was available for this analysis: 
 
User 1 User 2 
Standing, phone in bag Sitting, phone in hand 
Standing, phone in shirt 
pocket 
Standing, phone in hand 
Standing, phone in shirt 
pocket 
Sitting, phone in bag 
Standing, phone in shirt 
pocket 
Sitting, phone ins back 
pants pocket 
Standing, phone in hand Sitting, phone in bag 
Standing, phone in hand Sitting, phone in front 
pants pocket 
Standing, phone in hand Standing, phone in front 
pants pocket 
Standing, phone in front 
pants pockets 
Standing, phone in front 
pants pocket 
Standing, phone in front 
pants pockets 
Sitting, phone in bag 
Standing, phone in front 
pants pockets 
Sitting, phone in shirt 
pocket 
Sitting, phone in shirt 
pocket 
Sitting, phone in back 
pants pocket 
Sitting, phone in hand Sitting, phone in hand 
Sitting, phone in hand Sitting, phone in back 
pants pocket 
 
Table 1. Phone states of the analyzed data sets. 
Given that there have been multiple iterations of 
options available for contact tracing scoring in the 
A|G API, we need to state our understanding of the 
current state of affairs. Each phone with the A|G API 
will constantly produce privacy-protecting “chirps” at 
a roughly 4 Hz rate. Each phone will scan for these 
chirps no less frequently than once every 5 minutes, 
with a scan time of 4 seconds. However, the expected 
number of scans per 15 minute period is closer to 6, 
given the ability of the phones to opportunistically 
scan for BLE chirps. For each uniquely identified 
contact, the receiver will record the time of arrival of 
the chirp, the RSSI the chirp was received at, and a 
transmitted power level encoded into the chirp that 
represents the transmitting phone’s estimate of the 
power put into its antenna. When a generating key 
corresponding to a known index case is presented to 
the phone, the receiving phone will compare the set 
of pseudo-random bit sequences that the key 
generates to all of the chirp bit sequences it has 
recorded for some predetermined amount of time in 
the past. If the key-generated sequences match any 
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received chirp sequences, then the API will present 
the public-health authorized automated contact 
tracing app some subset of the recorded data. These 
data will at least contain the number of chirps 
received with attenuations below an app-defined 
threshold, and the minimum attenuation level 
estimated from that emitter. Thus, an M of N detector 
is possible, as well as a maximum value (minimum 
attenuation) detector. 
There is some uncertainty as to what data will be 
retained in each 4-second receiver scan, during which 
time it is likely that multiple chirps from any nearby 
device will be heard. For completeness, we consider 
three cases: only the first chirp heard from any given 
device during a scan period is recorded; all chirps 
from a given device are recorded during the scan 
period; and finally, only the chirp from a given device 
with the minimum attenuation during the scan period 
is recorded. The performance under these different 
assumptions will differ. The performance of the 
detector where the minimum attenuation value is 
provided per scan would result in a 1-of-N detector, 
which will, by definition, be no better than an M-of-
N detector for any value of N. Thus, for larger values 
of N we will plot only the M-of-N results, which will 
serve as an upper bound on the performance 
advantage which can be gained by using multiple 
samples per scan period.  
Under the first assumption, that only the first chirp 
received from a given device during a scan is 
recorded, performance for the expected number of 
chirps that would be seen within a “too long” period 
is given in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: DET curves for phone-carriage agnostic 
detector using 6 looks. Weighting refers to fraction of 
time a phone is assumed to be carried in any one state. 
It is evident that the performance of this detector will 
not be heavily dependent on our a-priori assumption 
of phone carriage distribution. It is also obvious from 
these plots that the performance of the state-agnostic 
detector will be poor; at a probability of detection of 
0.7, the probability of false alarm is 0.3. This is 
because the thresholds used for the detector must be 
fixed for all phone carriage situations. However, the 
distributions for H1 and H0 are highly contingent on 
phone carriage state, as can be seen in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11:  PDF curves for H1 (blue) and H0 (red) for 
phone in shirt pocket (solid) and phone in pants pocket 
(dashed) 
Note that the H1 PDF for phone in pants pocket sits 
almost on top of the H0 PDF for phone in shirt pocket. 
Choosing a single threshold to separate between H1 
and H0 for both of these phone carriage states with 
low false alarms and high probability of detection 
would be impossible – the PFA for phone in shirt 
pocket would be roughly equal to the PD for phone in 
pants pocket. 
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Performance may improve if we assume that during 
each 4-second scan period, we can record all of the 
RSSIs seen for a given index case and use them for 
the detection statistic. Note that it is assumed that the 
RSSI values within a four-second window will appear 
correlated, as pose angle and multipath conditions are 
unlikely to change dramatically within that time 
frame. 
Given the expected poor performance of the baseline 
detector, we have also evaluated the performance of 
some modified versions of the basic detector, 
including the usage of phone carriage states in setting 
individual thresholds for attenuation estimates prior 
to M-of-N testing. We have considered these state 
cognitive detectors using different look values for N.  
We now show in Figure 12 the performance of both 
phone carriage state cognitive and phone carriage 
state agnostic detectors for both the 6 independent and 
24 correlated sample cases: 
  
Figure 12:  DET curves for 6 independent and 24 
correlated looks, for phone carriage state agnostic and 
phone carriage state cognitive detectors 
It is clear that phone carriage state cognizance 
dominates over the additional correlated looks in 
terms of performance, at all but very low probabilities 
of detection. We can now look at how these detectors 
will perform in the FDR sense. Since FDR will be a 
function of the probability of detection at which the 
detector is chosen to operate, we plot FDR versus PD 
in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: FDR percentage for detectors as a function 
of PD – 6 uncorrelated samples and 24 correlated 
samples 
Again, the benefit of state cognition is shown clearly. 
Consider some potential operating points for a 
detector. In one case, we assume that we want a very 
high probability of detection (say, 90%). For the 
baseline 6-sample agnostic detector, the FDR would 
be close to 95%. That means that the number of false 
declarations per “true” TCFTL events would be about 
20:1. If, however, we use the cognitive detector with 
the same 6 samples, the FDR has decreased to about 
75%. This would produce about three false 
declarations for each “true” TCFTL event. If we use 
the phone carriage cognizant detector with 24 
correlated looks, then the FDR decreases further to 
slightly less than 60%, which corresponds to between 
1 and 2 false declarations per “true” TCFTL event. 
Another operating point would be to pick an 
acceptable FDR rate, and observe what PD would be 
achievable. For the baseline 6-sample agnostic 
detector, to achieve an FDR of 50% (where there is 
no more than one false declaration per true 
declaration), the PD must be lower than 0.17, which 
constitutes a fairly poor detedctor. Even allowing the 
use of 24 correlated samples only increases the PD to 
0.25. However, if we allow the use of a cognitive 
detector, the PD ranges from 55% with 6 uncorrelated 
looks to 80% for 24 correlated looks. 
Finally, we look in Figure 14 at what benefit 
additional looks, both correlated and uncorrelated, 
would provide the phone state cognitive detectors. 
Here, we look at the effects in terms of FDR for a 
fixed PD of 0.9. It is clear that for sample sizes larger 
than 10, having uncorrelated samples vs. correlated 
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samples is a large benefit; it also becomes clear that 
at this high PD level extra correlated samples beyond 
about 25 are of clearly providing diminishing returns. 
 
Figure 14: FDR percentage for state cognitive detectors 
as a function of number of samples – correlated samples 
taken within 6 BLE scans 5 minutes apart and 
uncorrelated samples, both with PD = 0.9. 
Summary 
Contact tracing is a proven method of mitigating the 
spread of infectious diseases. Automated contact 
tracing could be a strong augmentation to manual 
contact tracing, but in order to do this, a method for 
accurately identifying potential contacts of an 
infectious “index case” automatically must be 
developed. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacons 
have been proposed as a method for accomplishing 
this detector, but it has many impediments to 
accurately distinguishing between contacts that are 
truly “too close” from those that are actually “too far”. 
Understanding the performance of these detectors is 
important for public health authorities in their 
determining the efficacy and effectiveness of 
automated exposure notification as part of their 
response to the covid-19 pandemic. This paper 
examines methods of building detectors from BLE 
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) 
measurements. Our results indicate that the baseline 
(as currently understood) performance of the 
Apple/Google-API-enabled detectors will be 
relatively poor, as indicated in the false discovery rate 
(FDR) vs. detection probability curves for the 
agnostic detectors in Figure 13. More concretely, our 
predictions are that for a system which produces one 
false alarm per true TCFTL detected event 
(FDR=50%), less than 25% of the truly TCFTL 
events will be detected. However, with some feasible 
augmentations, we believe a detector with acceptable 
performance (greater than 80% correct identification 
of true TCFTL events, with an FDR of 50%) can be 
constructed. Specifically, an application of M of N 
detectors has been proposed which can provide robust 
performance when coupled with potentially available 
auxiliary data. We have collected data sets to allow us 
to evaluate the performance of these detectors, and we 
have shown the importance of using detectors which 
utilize both potentially available auxiliary data and 
signal strength sampling rates that provide between 
20 and 30 samples per “too long” period. 
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